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Sutherland: Conflict of Laws - An Interest Analysis Approach to Wyoming's Bor

CASE NOTES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-An Interest Ana!ysis Approach to Wyoming's Borrowing Statute. Duke v. Housen, 529 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), reh. denied,
100 S.Ct.
U.S ....
590 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied,
132 (1979); Bakcer v. First National Bank of Denver, 603 P.2d 397
(1979).

On April 4, 1970, Margaret Housen was introduced
to "Pony" Duke at Miss Housen's home in Virginia. That
night, following dinner, dancing and moderate drinking,
the couple engaged in sexual intercourse in the front seat
of Duke's pickup truck. On April 7, Housen met Duke in
New York where they once again engaged in sexual intercourse. The next morning, on April 8, the couple again had
intercourse before they left by truck, ostensibly for Wyoming. During the cross-country journey, Duke and Housen
continued to engage in intercourse April 8 and 9, in Pennsylvania; April 9 and 10, in Iowa; April 10 and 11, in
Nebraska; and April 20 and 21, again in New York. Finally,
on the morning of April 21, 1970, Duke broke off the relationship, and informed Housen for the first time that he
had gonorrhea, and that she had very likely contracted it
from him. Housen then left New York for Washington, D.C.
where laboratory tests taken April 22 confirmed the presence
of gonorrhea infection. By 1973, the infection had developed
into scar tissue adhesions requiring subsequent periodic surgery, and resulting in a reduced ability to bear children.
Housen filed her complaint on April 19, 1974, alleging
that Duke was grossly negligent in infecting Housen with
venereal disease. In his answer, Duke asserted that the
action was barred by the statute of limitations. However,
the trial court held that Wyoming's four year statute'
did not begin to run until 1973, when the adhesions
resulting from the infection were discovered. Thus, Housen
was awarded $300,000.00 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000.00 in exemplary damages.
Duke appealed the district court's decision, alleging the
trial court's error in holding that the claim was not barred
Copyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming

1. WYo. STAT. § 1-8-105 (1977).
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by the statute of limitations. Duke asserted that the action
was controlled by the Wyoming borrowing statute, which
states: "If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred
in this state."'
The defense was sustained by the Wyoming Supreme
Court.' The court agreed with plaintiff's proposition that
the statute of limitations of the place where the action is
brought controls in the event of a conflict of laws. Yet the
court declined to give the plaintiff's argument application
since it felt that any conflict had been erased by the borrowing statute. Thus, it was reasoned that the borrowing statute was binding on the court. However, before the borrowing
statute could be applied, it was necessary to determine where
the cause of action arose. To do so, the court assumed that
the defendant had passed on his infection to the plaintiff in
New York, the state where the second and last acts of
intercourse occurred. In this manner, it was reasoned that
the cause of action arose in New York on April 8, 1970, and
again in New York on April 21, 1970. Since the plaintiff
did not file her complaint until April 19, 1974, the court
held that the action was barred by New York's three year
statute of limitations. 4
In his concurring opinion,' Justice Thomas argued that
Washington, D.C., not New York, should be the principal
place of reference. Ignoring the majority's holding that the
place where the plaintiff was tortiously wronged was the
place where the cause of action arose, Justice Thomas reasoned that since the illness was identified in Washington,
D.C., the cause of action arose there. It was also argued
by the Justice that under the significant relationship test'
the result would be the same--Washington, D.C. would be
§ 1-3-117 (1977).
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), reh. denied, 590 P.2d 1340
(Wyo. 1979), cert. denied .-----U.S -....
, 100 S.Ct. 132 (1979).
4. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 214 (McKinney 1972).
5. Duke v. Housen, supra note 3, at 353 (concurring opinion).
6. The rule is that when an action involves more than one state, the law
of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and the parties will be applied. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 146 (1971).
2.

WYO. STAT.

3.
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the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to
the case, and would therefore be the place of the cause of
action. Thus, its three year statute of limitations7 would
operate to bar the plaintiff's claim.
Justice McClintock, in his dissenting opinion,' also
recognized the possibility that the transmission, incubation
and injury could have occurred in any of the five contact
states. The Justice reasoned that because there is no determinable state in which the cause of action arose, the borrowing statute could not apply. Justice McClintock further
reasoned that "it might be logically consistent with § 1-3-117
to hold the action barred if, by the law of all the states where
the action might possibly have arisen, the action is barred."9
However, that could not be the situation here, since it is
possible that the transmission of the infection might have
occurred in Nebraska, or taken effect in Nebraska, or taken
effect in Wyoming. In either case, a four year statute of
limitations would apply,"0 thus saving the plaintiff's claim.
This note will examine the legislative intent behind
borrowing statutes, explore the specialized problems which
have arisen in this area due to Wyoming's acceptance of the
territorial doctrine of conflict of laws, and advance solutions
to those problems.
THE

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

History and PhilosophicalBasis of Borrowing Statutes
Traditionally, American courts classified statutes of
limitation as procedural, rather than substantive matters."
Therefore, the limitations issue was to be determined by the
law of the "lex fori," where the suit was brought, regardless of where the cause of action arose. 2 Due to this proD.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1973).
Duke v. Housen, supra note 3, at 354 (dissenting opinion).
Id., (emphasis in original).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (1975); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977).
E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 603-04 (1934); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 127 (rev. ed. 1968).
12. Id.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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cedural characterization, the courts chose not to apply the
longer period imposed by the locus of the wrong when the
period of the local statute had run.'" Conversely, if the
forum's statutory period had not yet run, the action was
maintained though suit was barred in the foreign jurisdiction.'4 The theory was that the statute of limitations, being
a procedural matter, operated as a limitation upon the
remedy only: a plaintiff could enforce the right, which
continued to exist, wherever the remedy could be found."'
It can be seen that under this traditional rule, the
results of lawsuits depended on where the suit was brought,
since a cause of action barred by the "lex loci" could still
be sued on in those instances where the statutory period
was longer in the forum state than in the state in which
the cause of action arose. For this reason, a majority of
the states have enacted borrowing statutes17 which provide
that the limitation of the loci is imported or borrowed by
the forum. In this manner, it is possible "to insure that a
plaintiff . . .obtains thereby no greater rights than those
given in the state where his cause of action arose ... ""
A second goal behind the enactment of borrowing statutes is the reduction of the forum court's workload. 9 In
many cases the forum's limitations are longer than the
limitations of the state where the cause of action arose.
However, a borrowing statute is not used unless the forum's
period is longer." Thus, the longer limitation cannot operate
to encourage plaintiffs to bring their actions to the forum.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. FLA.
L. REV. 37, 38 (1962); H. GOODRICH AND E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 85 (4th ed. 1964).
LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 127.
McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet. 312) (1839); A. DE CERVERA, THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS ch. 1 (1966).
However, many courts and scholars have determined that the practical
effect of limitations statutes is substantive, not procedural, since they
actually terminate enforceable rights. See, e.g., Heavener v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Comment, Statute of Limitations and
the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L. J. 492, 497 (1919).
LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 128.
Ester, supra note 13, at 79-84.
Wilt v. Smack, 147 F. Supp. 700, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitation,
27 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 28 (1975).
See DE CERVERA, supra note 15, at 70; Developments in the Law-Statutes
of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1263 (1950).
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Borrowing statutes also serve to mitigate the effect
of the forum's tolling statute. Since the traditional rule
calls for the application of the forum's own procedural
rules, as long as the defendant is absent from the forum,
the forum's statute of limitations will not run. 1 Under the
traditional rule, then, an absent defendant could be subject
to perpetual liability.22 However, where the effect of the
borrowing statute is to adopt the limitations rule of the
foreign state, other rules affecting the application of that
limitation, including the foreign tolling provisions, are likewise adopted." The possibility of perpetual liability is thus
circumvented.
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL

INTERPRETATION

Although the policies underlying borrowing statutes are
well defined and generally accepted, the actual effect has
been not to simplify, but to compound the choice of law
problem. 4 In interpreting these statutes, the courts have
created a decisional chaos rarely surpassed in any other
branch of the law. This confusion is created by the language
which makes the choice of law reference depend on "where
the cause of action arose." The cases decided present a wide
variety of rulings as to where a cause of action may be
deemed to arise.25
Obviously, the question is not always merely academic.
In light of the Duke decision, it can be seen that the determination of the place where the cause of action arose is one
of the most important and most perplexing problems raised
by this statute.
Before the borrowing statute could be applied, it was
necessary that the Duke court determine where the cause
21. In the United States, absence of the defendant from the forum was
initially rejected as a reason for interrupting the running of the statute
of limitations. Rock Island Plow Co. v. Masterson, 96 Ark. 446, 132 S.W.
216 (1910). Today all states interrupt the running of the statute of limitations during the time that the defendant is absent from the state.
22. Milhollin, supra note 19, at 29.
23. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 128. Accord, Bonnifield v. Price, 1 Wyo. 223
(1875).
24.

R. WEINTRAUB,

COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 51, 52 (1st ed.

1971).
25. DE CERVERA, supra note 15, at 74-80; Ester, supra note 13, at 50.
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of action arose. The court recognized the traditional rule
that the law of the place where the plaintiff sustains injury
is the place of the cause of action. 6 Since there was no
evidence as to when or where plaintiff had been infected,
the court began with the basic proposition that the transmission of the infection had occurred in each of the states
where plaintiff and defendant had intercourse. 7 In chronological order, each of the states was examined as follows:
April 4 and 5, 1970, in Virginia." Virginia's two
year statute of limitations was deemed to have
barred the action in that state. By statutory law,
the statute of limitations would attach "from the
date the injury is sustained." The limitation would
run until April 5, 1972, thus barring the action
filed April 19, 1974. A judge-made exception to
the statutory enactment allowed that the limitation
begins to run upon the date of the last exposure.
It was reasoned by the court that if the judgemade rule was followed, the cause of action would
have arisen in New York, the place of the last
exposure, on April 22, 1970.
April 7 and 8, 1970, in New York.2" Consistent
with New York case law, the state's three year
statute of limitations was held to have attached at
the time injury was first produced. By operation
of New York's limitation, the action is barred.
April 8 and 9, 1970, in Pennsylvania." After a
careful reading of the authorities, the court determined that Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations attaches upon discovery of the tortious
wrong. Therefore, no cause of action arose in Pennsylvania since it was in Washington, D.C. where
plaintiff's infection was discovered.
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). This mechanical method
makes the choice of governing law depend entirely upon the place of the
wrong. This territorialist theory was prescribed by the original RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377-83 (1934).
27. Duke v. Housen, supra note 3, at 345.
28. Id., at 348-50.
29. Id., at 345-48.
30. Id., at 350-51.
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April 9 and 10, 1970, in Iowa. 1 Iowa, like Pennsylvania, follows the rule of discovery. Since the
infection was discovered in Washington, D.C., no
cause of action arose in Iowa.
April 10 and 11, 1970, in Nebraska.2 Nebraska
also follows the majority rule that a cause of
action arises once the injury is sustained. Under
that rule, the action would be barred by the state's
four year statute of limitations. The court did
point out that a federal court believes Nebraska
would follow the discovery rule in a case where
plaintiff was negligently subjected to continual
infection. However, under the rule of discovery,
the cause of action would have arisen in Washington, D.C.
April 20 and 21, 1970, in New York." Again, consistent with New York case law, the state's three
year statute of limitations was held to have attached at the time injury was first produced. By
operation of New York's limitation, the action is
barred.
April 22, 1970, in Washington, D.C. 4 Lastly,
Washington, D.C. was eliminated as the place
where the cause of action arose because no tortious
act was committed there.
In brief summary, the court reasoned that the laws
of Pennsylvania, Iowa and Nebraska were foreclosed from
application because of the reference made by those laws
to Washington, D.C. (the place of discovery); yet it chose
to eliminate Washington, D.C. as the place where the cause
of action arose. This paradox can be explained by the court's
adherence to the notion that where and when a cause of
action arises are in pari materia; that is, the cause arises
when, as well as where, the significant event to a suable
claim occurs."
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id., at 351.
Id., at 351-52.
Id., at 345-48.
Id., at 352-53.
Id., at 341, quoting with approval Bruner v. Martin, 76 Kan. 862, 93 P.
165, 166 (1907).
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The circularity of this reasoning has often been pointed
out." A court can only reason that a cause of action arises
"where" as well as "when" an event occurs by looking at
the law of the state within the borders of which the event
occurred. But this answer is not of any assistance when
determining which state's law to apply. Only by assuming
the solution in advance can one say that a cause of action
arises "where" an event occurred because the event occurred
there.
The tautology is even more obvious in cases in which
the "time" of accrual is at issue. As in the Duke case, if the
plaintiff was infected in New York, and later traveled to
Washington, D.C., did the cause of action accrue in Washington, D.C. when the infection was discovered, as provided by the laws of Washington, D.C., or did it accrue in
New York at the time of infection, as provided by New
York law?
It is interesting to note that had the majority subscribed to the time-place distinction, the plaintiff's action
may have been sustained." The majority, concurring and
dissenting opinions all adhered to the authority of the
original conflicts Restatement, Section 377.8 As noted in the
concurring opinion, that section sets forth the rule that:
2. When a person causes another voluntarily to
take a deleterious substance which takes effect
within the body, the place of wrong is where the
deleterious substance takes effect and not where
it is administered.
Rather than assume that the cause of action arose in
New York, the majority could just as easily have determined that the cause of action, the place where the "deleterious substance" took effect, arose in either Nebraska on
36. See, e.g., DE CERVERA, supra note 15, at 137, where it is explained that
the concept of the accrual of action is used to determine the applicable
statute of limitations, and also to determine when a cause of action begins
to run.
37. See Duke v. Housen, supra note 3 at 354, 356 (McClintock, J., dissenting).
38. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
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April 10 and 11, or in Wyoming on April 17, where the
plaintiff visited the defendant at his home."9 Both Nebraska
and Wyoming follow the rule that the statute of limitations
does not attach until plaintiff discovers the wrongful invasion.40 Since the discovery occurred in Washington, D.C.
on April 22, 1970, by operation of either state's four year
statute of limitations4' plaintiff would have had until April
22, 1974 to file her action. Since the action was filed April
14, 1974, the action would have been timely, and plaintiff's
action would have been sustained.
INTEREST ANALYSIS

Functionalism in Lieu of Territorialism
From the foregoing, the chaotic and irrational impact
of the borrowing statute is readily apparent. Moreover, it
seems ludicrous to apply the statute of limitation of the
place where the cause of action is deemed to have arisen.
In Duke, the issue to be determined was where plaintiff
sustained her injury. However, there was no evidence as to
where that might have been. Even so, the court felt compelled to hold that the cause of action arose in some definite
place. The territorial "arising" language of the borrowing
statute is meaningless here. In a case such as this, in which
the defendant is probably not suable in the state whose
period is borrowed, it is difficult to see how a "cause of
action" can "arise" there in any meaningful sense.4"
Conceivably, where a cause of action arises may be a
fortuitous circumstance which has no reasonable or relevant
interest in the issue involved. In Dindo v. Whitney,4 ' the
parties were involved in an automobile accident while travel39. Brief for Appellant at 8, Duke v. Housen, supra note 3.
40. Sylvania Electric Products v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Banner v. Town of Dayton. 474 P.2d 300
(Wyo. 1970); Town Council of Town of Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419,
263 P. 703 (1928).
41. NaB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (1975); WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977).
42. Moreover, the holding could constitute a violation of the due process clause.
Due process is violated if a court applies the law of a state having no
substantial connection with the facts. See, e.g., Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930).
43. 429 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1970).
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ing together through Quebec. The Vermont plaintiff sued
the New Hampshire defendant, and the defendant asked
that the court apply Quebec's shorter period. Holding for
the plaintiff, the court said: "The parties involved have only
the most fortuitous relations to Quebec. Quebec's only
interests underlying its statute of limitations are to protect its own citizens from 'stale' claims.""
Of course, preference for lex loci law is an approach
that can greatly simplify the judicial task in choice of law
cases. The mechanical rule is a virtue, and its simplicity
provides some justification for its use. In ultimately rejecting the rule," the courts were not able to deny this virtue.
Rather, they recognized that other policy factors should also
be considered. 4 Thus, the justification of simplicity was
subordinated to the mandate of conflict of laws-that of
providing "methods of choice which will facilitate the fair
and sensible accommodation of conflicting state policies."
This functional approach has been most commonly
termed "interest analysis." By this method, emphasis is
placed on the factual contacts which the case has with the
respective states, and on their importance with reference
to each issue being contested.4
Interest analysis begins with the premise that those
rules of law adopted by a community reflect that com44. Id., at 26 (emphasis added).
45. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at §§ 99, 131.
46. Leflar lists five basic factors to be applied in choice of law issues:
"(A) Predictability of results; (B) Maintenance of interstate and international order; (C) Simplification of the judicial task; (D) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests; (E) Application of the better
rule of law." LEFLAR, id., at § 96. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 146 (1971).
47. Cavers, Comment: The Two "Local Law" Theories (1950), in SELECTED
READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 124 (compiled by the Association of
American Law Schools, 1956).
48. "It gives the place having the most interest in the problem paramount
control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context,
thus allowing the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most
intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation." Auten
v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954). Accord, Babcock v.
Johnson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), where
the court rejected the mechanical conflict of laws rule applicable to tort
actions and initiated the formulation of a new choice of law rule based
on "a comparison of the relative contacts and interests . . . vis-a-vis the
issue presented." 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
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munity's public and private interests." It follows, then, that
to impose upon a forum handling a choice of law case a
rigid obedience to a mechanical conflicts rule would amount
to forcing the forum to automatically apply or reject rules
of law in deliberate ignorance of their underlying interests."
This would be irrational in terms of the interests involved,
and at times unfair to the individual litigants.
Once the territorial contacts approach gives way to a
rational evaluation of relevant interests, attention may be
given to the relationship between the underlying purpose
of a law and its functional realm of coverage. 5 In this
manner, the states' competing laws may be identified and
evaluated so that an intelligent decision may be made as
to which law should be applied.
Examining the legislative history of the borrowing
statute, it is apparent that the statute lends itself to an
interpretation consistent with interest analysis. Traditionally, the choice of law process involved first a choice
of jurisdictions, followed by an inquiry as to what is the
relevant substantive law of the selected state.2 In other
words, it was assumed by the framers of the borrowing
statute that the place where the cause of action arose would
be the jurisdiction whcse law would be borrowed. Since it
was originally intended that "cause of action" be synonymous with the law being borrowed, it follows that the
borrowing statute may be given a functional, rather than
a territorial, interpretation."
The separation of the limitations issue from the other
substantive issues presented is best accomplished by use of
49. A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 63 (1970).
50. See Tate, Book Review, CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT

OF

LAWS, 39 TUL. L. REv. 163, 169 (1964).

51. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L. J. 1087, 1123,
1127 (1956).
52. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 100.
53. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 11 Ohio App.2d 179, 229 N.E.2d
107 (Ct.App. 1967) (refused to apply limitations of place of injury without reference to "the degree of nexus" that place has to the action, even
though the forum statute borrowed the limitation of the place where the
action "arose.")
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the technique, "dgpecage," where each issue presented in
the case is analyzed separately. 4 Thus, each state's conflicting rules of limitation are identified and separated from
the other rules. Then the policies underlying the limitations
are weighed. The law of the state having the greatest
interest in the application of its statute of limitations is
then borrowed.
Before examining a more recent case, it would be well
to set out a brief methodology by which one might apply
interest analysis to the limitations issue presented in Duke.
As the Duke court noted, two basic policies are commonly
thought to underlie statutes of limitation: repose for defendants and judicial economy." These policies, among others,
are analyzed as to each state involved. For example, if it
could be found that no other state had a competing policy
interest underlying its statute of limitations, the Wyoming
court would then be fully justified in applying its statute
of limitations if it could show that the application of its
limitation would be necessary to fulfill its enumerated"
policies. On the other hand, a true conflict situation may
arise when each of two or more states' domestic rules
pointing to different results has an underlying policy which
would be meaningfully advanced by their application. In a
situation such as this, the forum may either weigh the
competing interests,5 T or focus on trends in the development of the law5 " so that the "better law" may be given
effect.
The basic premise of interest analysis is that every
legislature enacts laws for the benefit of its citizens."
54. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 109; Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach to
the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 299, 320 (1974).
55. "They are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale claim litigation
and spare citizens from having to defend when memories have faded,
witnesses are unavailable by death or disappearance and evidence is lost."
Duke v. Housen, supra note 3, at 340.
56. Only those asserted policies and principles which are genuinely held and
adequately supported by available evidence should be considered. Otherwise,
illusory interests might be applied on the sole basis of unfounded speculation. SHAPIRA, supra note 49, at 147.
57. See Baldwin v. Brown, 202 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
58. WEINTRAUB, supra note 24, at 39, 285.
59. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
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Thus, it can be seen that Wyoming has no domiciliary
interest in applying its longer limitations period in the case
at bar, since to do so would be contrary to the well-being
of its citizen, "Pony" Duke. Virginia has no domiciliary
interest to serve by application of its limitations either,
since its shorter statute would prevent its citizen from
recovering her damages. Likewise, of the remaining contact states, none have an applicable domiciliary interest
since each state's statute of limitations also expresses the
policy of repose for the defendant, yet no domiciled defendant is present to benefit from the application of that
policy.
This unusual situation, where no state can protect its
domiciliary interest by applying its statute of limitations,
was first identified as the "unprovided-for" case by Professor Currie." Thus, just as the territorial rule was
thwarted without a known lex loci, it appears that the
application of interest analysis is similarly frustrated in
the absence of primary (domiciliary) interests to be applied.
At this point, it would be useful to view the policies
behind limitations and torts in a broader perspective. Since
there are no primary interests to be protected, it is necessary
to inspect the possible altruistic interests of compensation
and deterrence. 1
Clearly, Wyoming would not be able to apply its tort
policies of compensation and deterrence. To provide the nonresident plaintiff with compensation would be contrary to
Wyoming's primary interest in protecting its defendantcitizen. Neither can Wyoming justify the application of its
statute as a deterrent since the evidence shows that no
tortious wrong occurred within its borders. 2
However, each of the remaining contact states can
reasonably claim an interest in applying its altruistic
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 152-53 (1963).
61. Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125 (1973).
62. Duke v. Housen, supra note 3, at 340.

60.
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policies. Of these remaining contact states, none has a
domiciliary defendant to protect, and none is hampered by
the definite lack of a tortious wrong within its borders.
Yet, because none of these states can properly claim to be
the lex loci, and thus claim a superior interest, we are left
with four states holding an equal interest in the application
of their limitations period, only one of which would allow
the plaintiff's action.
The author suggests that this problem could easily be
solved by placing the burden of proof on the issue of which
substantive law should apply upon the defendant. This solution seems desirable where, as in Duke, negligence on the
part of the defendant is clear, and it is only the issue of
which law to apply that is in doubt, so that the choice must
be made between letting the loss due to failure of proof
fall upon the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendant. 3
Therefore, if the defendant were unable to carry his burden,
the court would then borrow the law of the state that would
allow the plaintiff to recover.64
In this manner, it is possible to make an honest analysis
of which state's period of limitation is to be applied, despite
a lack of evidence as to where the wrong had accrued. However, a more complete analysis may be made where the lex
loci is known. Baker v. First National Bank of Denver"5
presents such a fact situation.
In Baker, a Colorado bank brought an action to foreclose a mortgage on real property located in Wyoming. The
defendant, also a resident of Colorado, had executed the
mortgage to secure the payment of a note given by him to
the plaintiff-bank. The mortgage contained a promise to
pay the indebtedness in Colorado, with the proviso that the
mortgagee could enforce the mortgage "according to Wyo63. Cf. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), where two defendants
negligently shot at a game bird and the plaintiff was struck by one shot,
which might have been fired by either gun. Rather than dismiss the action
against both for lack of proof against either, the court placed the burden
of proof upon the two defendants, and so permitted recovery against both.
64. In this case, the law borrowed would be that of Nebraska.
65. 603 P.2d 397 (Wyo. 1979).
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ming statutes governing mortgage foreclosures." Although
the plaintiff did not file this action until after the six year
Colorado statute of limitations66 had run, the action would
still have been timely under Wyoming's ten year statute
of limitations. 7 The court held that by operation of Wyoming's borrowing statute, the relief sought concerning the
note was barred by Colorado's limitation period. The
majority declined to address the issue whether the mortgage foreclosure action was barred, since the borrowed
Colorado law provided that the mortgage lien was extinguished once the indebtedness secured by the lien was
barred by a statute of limitations.
In their dissenting opinions," Justices McClintock and
Thomas argued that any issue concerning Wyoming real
property must be resolved by Wyoming law; that to apply
a foreign state's law to Wyoming land violates the principle
of state sovereignty. Thus, since the action to foreclose
could not be enforced by a Colorado court, there was no
cause of action upon which Colorado's limitation could
operate. Although the dissenting Justices believed the note
was subject to Colorado's limitation period, neither thought
it proper to likewise decide the foreclosure issue under
Colorado law. 9
Applying the principle of "depecage" once again,7" it
is possible to separate the issue of whether the action on the
note is barred from the issue of whether the act of foreclosure is barred. Applying interest analysis, the focus will
be upon determining which state's period of limitations can
most appropriately govern each issue. Every rule of law may
have a different purpose and should be analyzed separately.7
STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973).
67. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977).
68. Baker v. First National Bank of Denver, supra note 65, at 399-402 (dissenting opinions).
69. "[T]he mortgage is an independent contract, . . . and, as such, may be
foreclosed even though the action on the note is barred." Lundberg v.
Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, 229 Minn. 46, 216 N.W.2d
121, 123 (1974), cited in Baker v. First National Bank of Denver, supra
note 65, at 401 (McClintock, J., dissenting, with whom Thomas, J., joined).
70. See note 53, supra.
71. Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in the Choice of Law, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 58, 60 (1973) ; see, e.g., Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295

66. CoLo. REv.
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Addressing the issue of the note, it can be seen that
the policies underlying Colorado's domestic rule are applicable in light of that state's contacts with the parties and
the transaction. Here, the forum jurisdiction could only
conclude that only Colorado had any concern with the matter.
Unlike the Duke decision, where the court's analysis and
result were clearly contrary to interest analysis, the methodology and final result in Baker closely corresponded to that
of interest analysis. The Baker court could have applied the
older rule that the place of making the contract determines
where the cause of action arose.7" Instead, it chose to apply
the more popular rule that the cause of action arises where
the contract was to be performed. 3 The latter rule is based
on the assumption that the place of performance has a
more significant connection with the contractual transaction
than does the possibly unrelated place where the contract
happened to have been made. 4
In this respect, the place of performance rule is more
consistent with interest analysis than is the rule of the place
of making. However, even though the place where the contract was to be performed is an important factual contact
in deciding choice of law questions, it may not in every
case be the all-important contact. It is entirely possible that
a contract calls for performance to be rendered in two or
more states. In this event, it would be necessary for a court
to make a selection between possibly conflicting statutes of
limitation. It is suggested that the limitation period selected
would be the one that would sustain the contract, unless the
F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. 111. 1969), Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (suggesting that each of five issues might
be decided by the rule of a different state); GOODRICH, supra note 13, at
176, ("Separate issues in the same case may call for the application of
the laws of different states because of the relationship which the state
has to a particular issue.")
72. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1934)
(general), §§ 33-47
(applying the rule to various problems and special types of contracts).
73. Cantonwine v. Fehling, 582 P.2d 592 (Wyo. 1978); Bliler v. Boswell, 9
Wyo. 57, 59 P. 798 (1900), reh. denied, 9 Wyo. 277, 61 P. 867 (1900)
(where the place of performance is suggested to the effect that had the
claim been barred by the statute of limitations of such place, the action
would also have been barred at the forum), cited in Baker v. First National
Bank of Denver, 603 P.2d 397, 399 (Wyo. 1979). Accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 206 (1971).
74. LEFLAR, supra note 11, at § 144.
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enforcement of the contract would be contrary to social
policy.,'
The third traditional rule, now regarded more highly
than the other two, allows the parties to include in their
contract a provision as to which law shall govern.7" Yet the
court determined that the choice of law provision referring
to Wyoming's laws included Wyoming's borrowing statute
as well as its limitations period. In other words, the bank
made a self-defeating choice of law. Although it is a likely
construction that the bank did not intend for the borrowing
statute to apply, the court properly applied the rule that
any ambiguity is to be interpreted against the draftsman."
It is interesting to note that the Wyoming court gave
any consideration at all to the choice of law clause. Even
though Colorado was admittedly the lex loci (as to the
contract issue), the Wyoming court appeared to be willing
to enforce the choice of law clause. Had the Colorado bank
not made a self-defeating choice of law, Wyoming's law
would have been found applicable, despite the fact that to
do so would have been to derogate the territorial notion the
Wyoming court so desperately clings to.
Given that Colorado has the greater interest in applying
its statute of limitations to the action on the note, it is then
necessary to weigh Colorado's interest with Wyoming's
interest in applying its limitation period to the issue of
judicial foreclosure. The majority of the court chose to
apply a Colorado statute which provides that if the action
on the note is barred, then the action on the foreclosure is
also barred. 8 This rule corresponds with that of Balch v.
Arnold," where the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
75. Id., at § 150.
supra note 24, at 269-275. See also, RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
Cf. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882) (standing for the
if two states having contacts with the parties or the contract
the enforceability of the contract, the law should be applied
parties intended to be applied).
77. See, e.g., Hardware Wholesalers, Inc. v. Heath, 10 Ill.App.3d
N.E.2d 721, 725 (1973).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-40-112 (1973).
79. 9 Wyo. 17, 59 P. 434 (1899).
76.

WEINTRAUB,
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right to foreclose is barred when the action on the debt is
barred.
This situation provides the clearest case of a false. conHere, the respective legal standards of each jurisdiction are functionally similar and lead to the same conclusion-the ultimate result of litigation is bound to be substantially the same. In such situations the forum should
normally invoke domestic law as a matter of course."1 It
should be noted, however, that the law of the situs need not
always be applied to solve all questions that may arise with
reference to the land. The situs court may determine that the
law of the foreign jurisdiction ought to be applied because
relevant choice-influencing considerations call for that choice.
However, in a false conflict situation where the application
of either law would lead to an identical result, the application of situs law would serve to simplify title search by
allowing a possible bona fide purchaser to more easily
discover the status of the title, rather than requiring him
to ferret out the foreign law, gain an understanding of its
nuances, and apply it to the problem at hand.2
flict.8"

CONCLUSION

Stated simply, the mechanical interpretation of the
borrowing statute places controlling reliance upon one fact
which has no relation to the purpose of the conflicting
statutes of limitation and consequently results in many
decisions which frustrate the purposes and policies behind
the laws. Reference to Wyoming's borrowing statute is not
only proper but necessary when dealing with a choice of
law issue. Were the Wyoming Supreme Court to apply
interest analysis, the "arising" language could be interpreted in a manner which would advance the policies underlying the statute.
80. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 311 (1962).
81. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-BasicRule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH.
L. REv. 637 (1960).
82. LEFLAR, 8upra note 11, at § 165 (suggesting that the presence of a bona
fide purchaser could give rise to the situs state's dominant interest in
applying its law despite another state's interest).
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It is possible that in either the Duke case or the Baker
case, interest analysis would provide the same result already
reached by the court. The purpose behind interest analysis
is not to provide a greater variety of results, but to allow
a court to express more openly, a realistic reasoning.
Rod K. Sutherland
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